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Abstract 
A basic assumption in mainstream social cognition is that the path from perception to 
behaviour is often automatic and direct, as supported by  several experimental studies 
showing that priming can lead directly to a congruent behavior without any need of 
conscious awareness of the process. However, we argue that priming of a goal or an 
object activates individual differences in automatic evaluations at the associative level 
that in turn are they key predictors of action (gatekeeper model). A study (n=90) on 
stereotype towards Americans is presented to support the model. The results show that 
an IAT Americans predicts a relevant action (essay evaluation) but only under 
condition of priming. Implications for predictive validity of implicit measures are also 
discussed. 
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A simple stimulus can have different perceptions, meanings, evaluations, and elicit 
different behaviors for different people. Imagine that it is 13.00, you did not have 
lunch yet, are walking down the road and see somebody eating with gusto a 
hamburger. If you like meat and hamburgers, probably the sight of that person 
enjoying his hamburger will solicit your taste buds. The likelihood that you will think 
to buy a hamburger for lunch increases. If you see a McDonald’s 50 metres ahead of 
you, it will become instantly attractive. Chances are that you will enter and buy a 
hamburger for lunch. Suppose now that you don’t like meat and especially 
hamburgers. The sight of someone visibly enjoying a hamburger when you are hungry 
does not elicit particularly positive reactions. You will probably feel uneasy. If you 
see a McDonald’s 50 metres ahead of you, it will become instantly repulsive. Instead, 
you will be more likely to enter in the first vegetarian fast-food that you encounter to 
buy something to eat. Same stimulus, opposite reactions. If we add that these different 
reactions can vary systematically among persons in a relatively stable manner, here 
we enter into the realm of personality psychology. One of the key contributions of 
personality psychology has been in fact to devise psychometric measures that capture 
individual differences in basic constructs (traits, dimensions, factors). The underlying 
assumption is that not everybody thinks, evaluate, and behave in the same way. 
Rather, there are systematic inter-individual differences that can be helpful to predict 
what people will do and to understand why they do it.  
This paper will focus on the essential role of systematic and reliable individual 
differences in influencing behavior. More specifically, the focus will be on individual 
differences in implicit associative evaluations and on under what conditions they can 
best predict behavior. In so doing, we will propose a theoretical model that specifies 
the path from perception to behavior, passing through the non-conscious activation of 
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individual differences in associative evaluations. The main message will be that the 
influence of non-conscious activation (i.e., priming) on (automatic) behavior is 
fundamentally moderated by individual differences in the valence of the implicit 
associative evaluation of the activated concept.   
 
The ubiquitous influence of priming. The last two decades within social cognition 
have seen a dramatic surge of interest on nonconscious mechanisms leading to 
instances of so called automatic behavior, namely behavior that it is not performed 
deliberatively or intentionally (Dijkstheruis & Bargh, 2001; Greenwald & Banaji, 
1995). From the original research of Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977), dozens of 
studies have shown that nonconscious activation of psychological concepts (e.g, traits, 
goals, stereotypes, cultural ideologies) can lead directly to behavior (for reviews, see 
Bargh, 2006; Higgins, 1996). This is typically achieved through subliminal or 
supraliminal priming that increases, usually unbeknownst to the person, the 
accessibility of a psychological construct that in turn influences behavior. The effects 
of priming have been shown for a variety of psychological constructs such as trait 
inferences (Winter and Uleman, 1984), stereotypes (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996) 
and goals (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Troetschel, 2001). The 
theoretical mechanism can be described as follows (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). 
Behavior results as a consequence of relevant cognitive activities. These cognitive 
activities can be triggered by either internal (intentional) or external (automatic) 
sources. Priming is a means through which external sources trigger relevant cognitive 
activities that in turn activate behavior (cf. Figure 1a). The perception-behavior link is 
assumed to be highly automatized for most socially relevant situations, implying that 
the whole process can occur without any need for conscious awareness. From the 
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perspective of the influence of priming, this model implies that behavior will follow 
automatically in line with the primed concept. For example, if the prime concerns the 
concept of being rude, those who are exposed to the prime have an increased 
likelihood to behave rudely (cf. Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). This happens 
because priming makes temporarily more accessible the primed concept and initiates 
relevant cognitive activities that ultimately lead to action, without need for conscious 
or deliberative decision making. 
--Insert Figure 1 about here-- 
 
Individual differences as the gatekeeper to action. The theoretical mechanism depicted 
in Figure 1a shows how action can be directly elicited from perception. However, it 
fails to consider the role of individual differences in this process. To illustrate, 
imagine that Anna is an introverted person whereas John is extraverted. If they are 
primed with an extraversion-relevant stimulus (e.g., chat) and afterwards they meet a 
stranger, Anna probably will be even more silent than normally whereas John will be 
even more outgoing than usual. For the first person, the stimulus will probably 
activate thoughts relating to the uneasiness of communicating with unknown persons 
and the unpleasantness of a superficial chat. For the second, however, the same 
stimulus will probably elicit thoughts concerning the pleasantness of meeting new 
persons and of chatting with them. These reactions can be systematically different 
across persons and relatively consistent within the same person. These individual 
preferences can be conceived in a general sense as a form of valence appraisals that 
rely upon associative evaluations. They do not require conscious awareness and 
deliberative decisions, but can directly lead to behavior in line with individual 
preferences. The theoretical mechanism is depicted in Figure 1b in a general form, 
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although in this contribution we will focus mostly on the automatic path to action. The 
key novelty of the proposed mechanism is that external sources (e.g., priming) do not 
lead directly to action congruent to the prime, but rather they activate fast evaluative 
associations that in turn lead to behavior. Ample empirical evidence supports the idea 
that evaluations can be very fast, can occur automatically, and occur very early in the 
chain towards action (Fazio, 2001), both for known (Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & 
Hymes, 1996) and novel (Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, & Chaiken, 2002) stimuli. These 
automatic evaluations therefore critically determine whether behavior will be in line 
with or in the opposite direction to the primed concept. While part of these automatic 
evaluations can be a normative property of the activated concept and therefore 
affecting most people in a similar fashion, a major portion is related to relatively 
stable individual differences in the underlying associative valence.  
 
Implications. This theoretical model has a number of implications. First, priming can 
increase or decrease the likelihood of performing a congruent action depending on the 
associated automatic valence appraisals. The same prime can therefore result in 
assimilation (i.e., behavior lined up with the primed concept) or contrast (i.e., 
behavior opposite to the primed concept). The contrast effect can result in two main 
ways: a) as a decrease of the likelihood of performing the congruent action or b) as an 
increase of the likelihood of performing an associated but opposite action. To 
exemplify, priming a hamburger can create a contrast effect that can either lead to a 
reduced likelihood in buying a hamburger or to an increase in the likelihood of buying 
a salad. Note that the contrast/assimilation distinction has been already studied in the 
context of priming but it has been linked to the awareness of the prime, with contrast 
effects likely to happen if there is clear awareness of the prime manipulation (e.g., 
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Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kubler, & Wanke, 1993). However, the gatekeeper model 
assumes that even when there is no awareness of the prime, still there can be a 
contrast effect as a function of individual differences in automatic evaluations. 
Second, whether there is a direct main effect of priming on behavior will depend also 
on the average valence of the primed concept/action. In other words, if for most 
people the associated thoughts initiated by priming are positive, a main assimilation 
effect will be more likely, whereas a main contrast effect will be more likely if the 
thoughts are mostly negative. Third, like for many other situational effects, the effects 
of priming will be moderated by individual differences in the relevant constructs. In 
this specific case, these will be individual differences in automatic associative 
evaluations. Therefore, to test the model, it is essential to have a corresponding 
reliable psychometric measure. As we will argue below, there are a number of such 
measures, most notably the Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998). Fourth, a prime can be successful even without a main effect on 
behavior. In fact, the model implies that priming mainly activates individual 
differences in evaluative associations. This may or may not result in a main effect on 
action but it should be reflected in a significant correlation between such individual 
differences and behavior. In other words, the key test supporting the gatekeeper model 
is whether individual differences in associative evaluations moderate the effect of 
priming on behavior.  
 
Individual differences in automatic evaluations. The last few years have seen the 
development and widespread adoption of a number of paradigms devoted to 
measuring individual differences in automatic evaluations, such as affective priming 
(Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986), the Go/No Go Task (GNAT, Nosek 
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& Banaji, 2001), the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST, De Houwer, 2003), the 
Masked Affective Priming (MAP, Frings & Wentura, 2003), and the Affect 
Misattribution Procedure (AMP, Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). 
However, the most widely used procedure to measure implicit attitudes is the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Several studies have 
shown that the IAT has good internal consistency (usually =.80) and reasonable test-
retest values (usually r=.60). The IAT has also the greatest evidence of construct and 
predictive validity (for recent reviews, see Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, in press; 
Poehlman, Uhlman, Greenwald, & Banaji, in press). Briefly, the IAT is a 
computerised method for indirectly measuring the strength of the association between 
a target concept and a valence attribute via a double-categorization task. It relies on 
the assumption that, if a target concept and an attribute dimension are highly 
associated (congruent), the task will be easier, and therefore quicker, when they share 
the same response key than when they require a different response key. The IAT 
needs one target category (e.g., Black), one contrast category (e.g., White), one target 
attribute (e.g., positive), and one contrast attribute (e.g., negative), each represented 
by a series of stimuli. In the critical combined task, stimuli from all four classes are 
presented and participants are asked to assign them correctly to one of the two 
combined category-attribute pairs (e.g., right key for Black-positive and left key for 
White-negative). This combined task is successively switched such that the pair 
category-attribute is the opposite. An IAT score is computed as the difference of the 
mean response times between the two versions of the combined task. From the 
perspective of the theoretical model that we propose, the IAT represents a reliable and 
valid means to tap individual differences in the automatic evaluative associations that 
are activated by priming.  
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Aims of the study.  
This study aims at testing the model described above. Additional empirical evidence 
supporting this model is contained in Perugini, Conner, and O’Gorman (2006) and 
will be briefly reviewed later on in the final discussion paragraph. To recap the main 
mechanism, priming can be thought of as a means to increase the mental accessibility 
of the primed concept. One of the very first mental operations performed when a 
concept is salient is an automatic evaluation. This automatic evaluation is partly 
determined by relatively stable individual differences in the underlying evaluative 
associative structures. Behavior will follow either by assimilation or by contrast 
depending on the valence of this evaluation. Therefore, the crucial hypothesis is that 
automatic evaluations, as tapped by an implicit measure, will moderate the influence 
of priming on behavior.  
To test this model, we focused on the stereotype towards Americans. The literature on 
stereotypes mostly focuses on minority or historically disadvantaged groups and 
therefore the focus has rarely been placed on Americans as a stereotype target. The 
most conspicuous exception is the classic study by Katz and Braly (1933) on national 
stereotypes, recently revisited by Madon et al. (2001). Both the original and the 
revisited study included Americans as a target. The most endorsed adjectives used to 
characterize Americans were with both positive (e.g., diverse, democratic, pleasure 
loving) and less clearly positive (e.g., materialistic, individualistic, lazy) valence. 
However, the studies did not provide overall measures of stereotype content but 
simply reported lists of adjectives that were endorsed to characterize Americans. 
Moreover, the samples were composed of American participants. Recently, a model 
of stereotype content has been proposed by Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, and Xu (2002). The 
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authors collected empirical evidence that two main dimensions, competence and 
warmth, can be usefully adopted to describe stereotypes associated with groups. These 
two dimensions are thought to act as organizers of evaluations – groups are placed on 
the continuum bi-dimensional space resulting from simultaneously considering 
warmth and competence. However, the study focused on specific subgroups (e.g., 
Feminists, Housewives, Elderly) and on racial minority groups (e.g., Jews, Hispanics, 
Blacks) rather than Americans as an overall group. In this study we will focus on this 
generic American stereotype and use Australians as a contrast category. There are two 
main reasons why we chose Australians. First, the IAT needs a contrast category and 
therefore we had to think about a group that could act as a contrast. Second, the study 
was performed in UK and, from an English perspective, both Americans and 
Australians share a common language and ancestry but differ in terms of stereotypes 
associated to them. Moreover, the subtle differences between American and British 
(adopted also by Australians) spelling in the written language was a nice feature that 
helped us to design the experiment, as described below. In the following contribution, 
we will report the main study, preceded by a short report of a preliminary study aimed 
at ascertaining the dimensionality of the stereotype content for both Americans and 
Australians.  
 
Preliminary study 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
 One hundred forty six undergraduate students, prospective students, and 
accompanying parents of a British university provided data for this preliminary study. 
Due to a mistake in printing, demographic data were not collected for 66 participants. 
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For the remaining 80 participants, there were 45 females and the mean age was 32.0 
(SD 14.5). These values should be considered as roughly representative of the whole 
sample. The participants were contacted either individually on campus or as they 
participated in a visit day in the local Department of Psychology. They were handed 
the questionnaire and were debriefed afterwards about the purposes of the study. 
Materials  
The measure derived from Fiske et al. (2002) assessed stereotype content towards 
Americans and Australians. Specifically, the items: ‘As viewed by society, how 
_______ are American (Australian) people?’ was filled in by 12 adjectives, 6 referring 
to competence (competent, confident, capable, efficient, intelligent, skillful) and 6 to 
warmth (friendly, well-intentioned, trustworthy, warm, good-natured, sincere). 
Approximately half of the sample was presented with Australians first and half with 
Americans first.   
Results and discussion 
The means of all 12 adjectives were compared with a t-test for Americans and 
Australians. As depicted in Figure 2, Americans were systematically judged as 
possessing less of the qualities indicated by the adjectives, with the exception of 
“confident”.  
--Insert Figure 2 about here-- 
All paired t-test comparisons were statistically significant (from p<.0005 to p=.025) 
with the exception of “efficient” (p=.119). Overall, the American profile was 
significantly less positive than the Australian one (t(145)=-5.106, p<.0005, M=2.89, 
SD=0.78 vs. M=3.17, SD=0.72). Next, the factorial structures were ascertained. For 
both targets, a two-factor solution was not very convincing. For the Americans, the 
eigenvalues revealed a strong first factor (6.96) explaining 58.0% of the total variance 
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and a much weaker second factor (1.22; variance explained = 10.2%). An Oblimin 
rotated solution clarified that whereas one factor mirrored the competence dimension, 
the second factor had three strong markers of the warmth dimension (friendly, warm, 
good-natured) and the three remaining items that had sizeable loadings on both 
factors. The correlation between the factors was quite high (.55). On the contrary, the 
one-factor solution revealed strong loadings from all 12 items, ranging from .48 
(confident) to .88 (skilful). These results were almost identical for the Australian 
target, with a first factor explaining 61.2% of variance and the second 9.1%, the two 
factors highly correlated (.66), the same three clear markers for the factor warmth, and 
strong loadings for all items (from .50, confident, to .85, trustworthy) in a single 
factor solution.  
To sum up, this preliminary study has indicated that the bi-dimensional structure 
proposed by Fiske et al. (2002) of competence vs. warmth is not well supported by the 
data. Only one factor is well defined by its markers whereas the second is only partly 
defined. Moreover, the two factors are highly correlated, in the region of .60. Finally, 
a single dimension of positivity seems by far the most important factor, explaining 
around 60% of the total variance. Therefore, also for the sake of simplification, we 
decided to consider in the main study a single dimension of positivity and selected 
three markers each from competence and warmth so to have a balanced representation 
of the positivity dimension.  
Main study 
Method 
Participants 
 Ninety-two British students (mean age = 25.4, SD=9.4; 53.3% males)1 at a 
British university participated in this experiment. Two participants were excluded 
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from the analysis. One participant was excluded due to a high percentage of quick 
responses (32.5% of response latencies were under 300ms) and errors (36.6%), 
indicating a random response pattern. A second participant was excluded because the 
dependent variable (essay quality, see below) was more than 3 SD below the mean of 
the group and about 1.4 SD away from the nearest data point2.  
 
Design and Procedure 
 All participants were tested individually at a cubicle. They first completed a 
measure of relative implicit preference for Americans vs. Australians before 
responding to items assessing their explicit attitudes towards these two groups (first 
related to Americans and then to Australians). Following this, participants were 
presented with a scrambled sentence task (Srull & Wyer, 1979). The task presented 20 
scrambled sentences comprising five words each from which participants had to 
construct sentences using four of the words. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two versions of this task. One version used typically Americans words (e.g., 
subway, elevator, dork, gasoline, cheerleaders, skyscrapers, liqor, thanksgiving) in 15 
out of the 20 sentences (priming condition) and a second version contained all neutral 
sentences (control condition). Immediately after the priming task, participants read 
and rated the qualities of the essay. This task was designed so that participants would 
have an opportunity to immediately use the recently activated American stereotype. 
The essay was one page A4 long and, while discussing pros and cons of the 
introduction of the Euro in the UK, it finally advocated that the Euro should not be 
introduced. It was pre-selected in a pilot study with a different sample (n=40) where it 
was rated on a composite of 2 indicators for importance (importance, relevance) and 3 
for qualities (convincing, based on facts, effective). We wanted to select an essay with 
The gatekeeper model    14  
moderate importance, so to engage the participants, and good but not excellent 
quality, so to leave room for individual differences in evaluation. The ratings were on 
a scale from 1 to 5. Participants judged the essay as moderately important (3.4) and 
with good qualities (3.65), therefore meeting our requirements. To ensure that the 
stereotype could be applicable to the essay, two features were incorporated. First, the 
essay included a paragraph containing a parallel with the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) agreement among US, Canada, and Mexico. Second, the essay 
incorporated American spelling. In practice, this meant that words such as analyze, 
centered, and colors were used in place of their British and Australian equivalents 
(analyse, centred, colours). There were six such words in the whole essay. Finally 
participants were probed for suspicion about the nature of the study and debriefed 
afterwards. No participant expressed suspicion about the nature of the study. 
 
Measures  
 Implicit attitudes towards Americans relative to Australians were assessed 
using the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). 
The IAT followed the standard 5-step format with the first, second and fourth steps 
being practice and the third and fifth steps including practice and critical test phases. 
Steps 1, 2 and 4 involved sorting stimuli from two categories to one of two responses 
(step 1- American targets to the left response button and Australian targets to the right 
response button; step 2- positive attributes to the left response and negative attributes 
to the right response; step 4- American stimuli to the right response button and 
Australian stimuli to left response button).  In step 3, participants were required to 
arrange stimuli from four categories to one of two responses (American and positive 
stimuli to the left response key and Australian and negative stimuli to the right 
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response key). In step 5, the pairings from step 3 were reversed, such that the attribute 
categories remained assigned to the same response key but the target categories were 
switched. The target categories were American (Buffalo, American, Baseball, 
Chicago, Yank) and Australian (Kangaroo, Australian, Cricket, Sydney, Aussie) 
whereas the attribute categories were Positive (Love, Gift, Joy, Rainbow, Pleasure) 
and Negative (Evil, Cancer, Death, Agony, Vomit). There were 20 practice trials in 
steps 1, 2 and 4.  Steps 3 and 5 contained 20 practice trials followed by 60 test trials 
(plus two dummy initial trials that were discarded) for the critical steps 3 and 5. The 
IAT was counterbalanced between subjects for steps 3 and 5. 
 IAT scores were calculated using the recently proposed D algorithm 
(Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) and weighting practice and test trials according 
to their proportion in the overall score. The IAT score was coded such that a positive 
score reflected implicit preference for Americans over Australians and it was reliable 
(α =.78). 
 Explicit attitudes (stereotypes) towards Americans and Australians were 
measured with a slightly modified and reduced version of the instrument used in the 
preliminary study. Specifically, the stem was modified in the first person singular and 
read ‘In your opinion, how ______ are American (Australian) people?. The stem was 
personalized because we wanted to gather their individual opinion. It was followed by 
six adjectives, three related to competence (competent, capable, efficient) and three to 
warmth (friendly, well-intentioned, warm) rated on a five-point scale (1=not at all, 
5=extremely). The mean average score was calculated by subtracting the evaluation 
for Australians from the ones of Americans so to generate a relative measure similar 
to the implicit attitude. Based on the preliminary study, we aimed at an overall 
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composite measure of stereotype positivity3. The measure yielded a satisfactory 
internal reliability (α=.73).    
 Five items, along 10-point bipolar scales (1=not at all – 10=extremely), 
assessed essay quality: ‘How capable of changing people’s opinions is this essay?’, 
‘How trustworthy do you think the writer is?’, ‘How intelligent do you think the essay 
is?’, ‘How well-intentioned do you think the writer is?’ and ‘How sincere do you 
believe the essay to be?’ A PCA indicated a single factor structure (eigenvalue=2.89 
accounting for 57.8% variance) with all items satisfactorily loading onto the factor (all 
loadings >.63). The measure was internally reliable (α=.81).  
Results and Discussion 
 Participants displayed no implicit preference for Americans or Australians 
(M=.02, SD=.25; t(89)=0.92, p=.36. However, participants’ explicit attitudes were 
significantly less positive towards Americans than Australians, t(89)=-3.72, p<.0005 
(M=3.34, SD=0.59 vs. M=3.62, SD=0.54), therefore confirming the results obtained 
in the preliminary study. The correlations between the variables are displayed in Table 
1. 
--Insert Table 1 about here-- 
 Priming condition was unrelated to any of the measures (all p>.31) suggesting 
that the participants in the American and neutral prime conditions were equivalent 
across the predictor variables. Furthermore, priming did not have a direct effect on 
essay quality, r=-.11, p=.30. This implies that the essay was rated equally in both 
conditions (M=6.77, priming, vs. M=6.99, control). Only explicit attitudes, r=.23, 
p=.03, was significantly related to essay quality. Implicit attitudes were unrelated to 
the explicit ones (r=14, p=.19). To assess how the interrelationships between the 
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study variables varied across groups, Pearson’s correlations were calculated 
separately for each condition (see Table 2). 
--Insert Table 2 about here-- 
 When the statistics were calculated separately for each condition, implicit 
attitudes were the sole significant predictor of the essay quality but only within the 
priming condition, r=.31, p=.04. In the neutral condition, implicit attitudes were not 
related to essay judgment r=-.20, p=.19. To formally test the key hypothesis, a 
hierarchical regression analysis was conducted in which the standardized implicit 
attitude measure and priming manipulation were entered on the first step before their 
interaction on the second step. A significant interaction would imply that the effect of 
priming on behavior is dependent on individual differences in one’s automatic 
evaluation concerning the target concept (Americans). 
 On the first step, the model was non-significant, F(2, 87)=0.73, p=.48, with 
neither priming condition, β=-.21, p=33, nor implicit attitudes, β=.07, p=.51, 
predicting essay quality. However, on the second step the model was almost 
significant, F(3, 86)=2.54, p=.06 and, crucially, there was a significant interaction 
β=.51, p=.02, indicating that the effect of priming on essay quality was moderated by 
one’s implicit attitudes. 
 Once the key effect was established, ancillary analyses were conducted to 
ascertain its uniqueness. First, we checked whether priming had a similar effect on 
explicit attitudes. They were predictive of essay quality (β=.22, p=.03) but, crucially, 
this effect was not qualified by a significant interaction with priming (β=-.04, p=.86). 
Note that this result not only implies that the priming manipulation activated 
exclusively implicit attitudes, but also that the essay effectively elicited the 
application of stereotypic opinions, as evidenced by the main effect of explicit 
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attitudes across conditions. Second, we checked whether the effect of priming on 
implicit attitudes still remained when including explicit attitudes in the regression 
equation. This was the case. Explicit attitude predicted significantly essay quality 
(β=.20, p=.05) and the interaction between IAT and priming remained significant 
(β=.52, p=.01).  
 
General Discussion 
The results confirmed the key hypothesis and supported the proposed theoretical 
model. The effects of priming on behavior were moderated by individual differences 
in valence automatically associated to the primed concept. These results mirror those 
obtained by Perugini et al.(2006) in two studies on spontaneous helping. The first 
study adopted an IAT attitudinal measure of Altruism and included a subliminal 
priming manipulation embedded in a lexical decision task whereby masked primes 
relative to altruism were presented for 42 ms. The dependent variable was the number 
of video-clips participants volunteered to watch and rate for an unrelated fictitious 
experiment (spontaneous helping). Similar to the study presented here, the IAT 
predicted spontaneous helping but only under condition of priming, a germane 
explicit attitudinal measure was not affected by priming, and there was no main effect 
of priming on behavior. The second study was identical to the first except that this 
time the measures were taken one week before the priming manipulation and the 
dependent variable spontaneous helping. The results were qualitatively identical. The 
present results add significantly to the empirical evidence in favor of the gatekeeper 
model by adopting a different priming manipulation (supraliminal), focusing on a 
different domain (stereotype about Americans) and using a different form of behavior 
(essay evaluation).  
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An important result of all these studies is that the effects were exclusive to the IAT 
and they were not affected when explicit attitudes were also considered. It is useful to 
embed these results within current theoretical models of decision-making. Strack and 
Deutsch (2004) recently proposed their reflective-impulsive model that distinguishes 
between a fast, association-based system (impulsive) and a slow, deliberative-based 
system (reflective). In terms of measures, an implicit measure like the IAT taps into 
the associative network whereas an explicit measure impinges upon the reflective 
system. The results obtained in this study, as well as those concerning spontaneous 
helping, seem to support the idea that it is possible to selectively activate only one 
system independently of the other. Specifically, priming had an activating influence 
only on evaluative individual differences as reflected in implicit but not in the explicit 
measures that, however, predicted the evaluation of the essay independently of the 
effects of priming. It seems more reasonable to explain our results by assuming a dual 
system of attitudes (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000) rather than a single attitude-
two measures system (Fazio & Olson, 2003), although probably the two perspectives 
might be stretched to accommodate most empirical findings.  
It should be emphasized that the results can also be read from the perspective of what 
conditions are needed to increase the predictive validity of implicit measures. This is 
an essential issue for establishing the theoretical relevance and pragmatic utility of an 
implicit measure (cf. Perugini, 2005). In fact, the results suggest that the IAT predicts 
relevant behavior best if the concept associated to the behavior is activated. It is 
interesting to incorporate this finding with some recent literature. Hofmann, Rauch, 
and Gawronski (in press) have shown that control resources moderate the predictive 
validity of the IAT. Specifically, when control resources are low or depleted, an 
implicit measure predicts relevant behavior more accurately. Therefore, it would seem 
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that it is possible to increase the predictive validity of an implicit measure both by 
increasing the availability of the relevant concept in the associative network 
(impulsive system) and by decreasing the control resources that are needed for 
deliberative processes (reflective system). In a related vein, Perugini, O’Gorman and 
Prestwich (in press) have shown that the predictive validity of an implicit measure can 
be enhanced by activating the self before performing the IAT measure, although it 
depends on what is exactly activated in the self. In this latter case the emphasis is on 
conditions that improve the validity of the measure as such. However, in all cases the 
results start to identify theoretically meaningful conditions that enhance the predictive 
validity of an implicit measure. 
 
Conclusions 
It is worthwhile to highlight that while the study presented here focused on a specific 
implicit measure of attitudes, the gatekeeper model is more general and does not 
depend on the application of specific measures. The gist is that perception activates 
(automatic) cognitive activities that in turn lead to behaviors. However, unlike 
mainstream social cognitive models, it is maintained that individual differences in 
these cognitive activities critically influence what kind of behavior will be performed. 
Among these cognitive activities, automatic evaluations have a prominent role and 
they occur early in the chain to action. Therefore, individual differences in automatic 
evaluations have a key role in determining action: they are the gatekeeper. Future 
research will be needed to replicate the results and to establish precisely the 
conditions under which these effects are present.  
A final thought concerns a certain (admittedly loose) parallel between the gatekeeper 
model presented herein and the relationships between social psychology and 
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personality in the 60’s and 70’s. The critical book of Mischel (1968) paved the way 
for a ferocious attack on personality research and on its capability to actually explain 
or even predict behavior and advocated the normative influence of situations. Later 
research clarified that stable individual differences in relevant personality dimensions, 
instead, have a central role either directly or in interaction with situational factors for 
predicting behavior (e.g., Kenrick & Funder, 1988). Today the emphasis of 
mainstream social cognition is on the automatic (and normative) link between 
perception and action. The gatekeeper model seeks to establish that this link is 
fundamentally affected by relatively stable individual differences in automatic 
evaluations. In its strong version, the gatekeeper model may suggest that the direct 
perception-action link is an epiphenomenon because the key theoretical mechanism 
resides in the activation of automatic evaluations that systematically reflect individual 
differences in associative evaluations. Therefore, from this extreme perspective, there 
is no such a thing as a direct automatic perception-action path. A weaker version of 
the model instead would maintain that individual differences fundamentally moderate 
whatever normative effect is associated with the direct link perception-action. While 
the first view would suggest that main effects of priming on behavior are more the 
exception than the rule (the rule being an interaction effect with individual differences 
in automatic evaluations) and can be found mostly in some specifiable conditions, this 
second weaker view would suggest that alongside a main effect there will often be a 
moderation effect of individual differences. Future research will clarify which one of 
the two versions fits best with available empirical evidence. Either way, the role of 
individual differences is assumed to be key in the automatic direct link between 
perception and action. Therefore, the gatekeeper model can be seen as an attempt to 
establish a foundational role for individual differences, although in the 2000’s the 
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focus is on automatic processes rather than on situations. Blending two famous quotes 
from ancient philosophers, history repeats itself (Vico) but you can’t step twice in the 
same river (Heraclitus).  
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FOOTNOTES 
1 Unfortunately a programming mistake meant that gender and age were not recorded 
for the first 32 participants, after which the mistake was corrected. The descriptive 
statistics, although relative to this sub-sample of 60 participants, should be considered 
as approximately reflecting the whole sample. 
2 The results are not affected significantly by including this participant. All the effects 
that we have discussed in the study remain statistically significant. 
3 We ran the analyses also considering separately a dimension of competence and 
warmth. The main conclusions are not affected.  
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Table 1: Correlations between study variables  
 
a) full-sample, n=90 
       1    2    3     4  
1. Priming Condition (0=Neutral, 1=American) - -.06 -.07 -.11 
2. IAT score          -   .14   .08 
3. Explicit Attitude          -   .23* 
4. Essay Quality            - 
 
b) by condition (priming: n=45, neutral: n=45). 
       1  2  3  
1.  IAT score 
 Priming     - .24 .31* 
 Neutral     - .05 -.20 
2. Explicit Attitude      
 Priming      - .18 
 Neutral      - .28  
3. Essay Quality 
 Priming       - 
 Neutral       - 
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Figure 1. Mainstream social cognitive model (a) and the gatekeeper model (b)  
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Figure 2. Stereotype content for Americans and Australians (N=146) 
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